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AbstrAct – the use of equally compelling arguments both for and 
against the truth of a proposition were known in the renaissance as 
arguments in utramque partem. Early modern sceptics used arguments 
in utramque partem in order to show that one cannot ground morality 
on safe grounds, for the arguments which are presented in favor of the 
idea of justice could be neutralized by equally compelling arguments 
against the idea of justice. In this paper, I argue that Hugo Grotius 
tried to refute this kind of moral scepticism in his main philosophical 
writings, De jure bellic ac pacis and De jure praedae commentarius. 
Against the sceptic, Grotius seeks to establish that the reasons which 
are consecutively presented for and against the idea of justice are not 
incompatible with each other.
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rEsUMO – O uso de argumentos igualmente convincentes tanto em 
prol quanto contra a veracidade de uma proposição era conhecido na 
renascença como in utramque partem. céticos do início da Modernidade 
utilizaram argumentos in utramque partem visando demonstrar que não 
se pode fundamentar a moralidade em um terreno sólido, já que os 
argumentos apresentados em favor da ideia de Justiça poderiam ser 
neutralizados por argumentos igualmente convincentes contra a ideia 
de Justiça. Nesse artigo, eu argumento que Hugo Grotius tentou refutar 
esse tipo de ceticismo moral em seus principais escritos filosóficos, De 
jure bellic ac pacis e De jure praedae commentarius. contra os céticos, 
Grotius procura estabelecer que as razões apresentadas a favor e contra 
a ideia de Justiça não são incompatíveis entre si.
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I
there was in the renaissance a rediscovery of Greek ancient sceptical 
writings. the texts by sceptics such as, for instance, sextus Empiricus 
were initially examined as a further source of information on the culture 
of antiquity, but the sceptical arguments they contained gradually 
began to be discussed in practically every ambit of sixteenth and 
seventeenth century culture, such as theology, morality, epistemology, 
and metaphysics. It is no surprise, then, that in this context some pre-
modern ideas relative to the legitimacy of political authority were also 
cast into doubt. Previously to the emergence of modern political thought, 
thomas Aquinas, for instance, had assumed that every person has a 
‘natural inclination’ (inclinatio naturalis) to live in society.1 For this reason, 
he also assumed that legitimate political authority was expected to 
ensure that human being’s natural inclinations would be furthered, and 
that deviations from natural inclinations would be either discouraged or 
punished. Aquinas’ theory involved the theological assumption, contained 
the New testament, that God wanted individuals to love each other in 
the same way each person, considered individually, loves herself.2 but 
in the face of modern scepticism, this assumption proved doubtful. Why, 
indeed, should one accept that one is naturally disposed to care about 
one’s fellow-men as much as one cares about oneself, or that there is a 
divine commandment enjoining one to love other individuals? If neither 
natural law theory nor theology could provide compelling reasons for an 
individual to curb the pursuit of his or her own interest to the benefit of 
other individuals, then, at first glance, no reasonable justification could 
be offered for the legitimacy of political authority. For the standards for 
the moral assessment of political authority had been traditionally derived 
from received natural law ideas and theological assumptions. 
On the other hand, at the same time traditional assumptions 
relative to the justification of political authority were being cast into 
doubt by means of sceptical arguments, sixteenth and seventeenth-
century European culture witnessed remarkable achievements in the 
field of natural sciences. A distinguishing feature of modern scientific   
 
1  AqUINAs. Summa Theologiae, edited by thomas Gilby (cambridge University Press: 
2006) vol. 28, Ia IIae, q. 94.
2  cf. Matthew (22: 37-40): ‘Jesus said to him, ‘Love the Lord your God with all your heart, 
with all your soul, and with all your mind.’ this is the first and greatest commandment. 
the second is like it: ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’ All the law and the prophets 
depend on these two commandments.’ cf. also John (13, 34): ‘A new commandment 
I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one   
another.’M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, Moral Scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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methodology consisted in the attempt to employ mathematics in the 
investigation of natural phenomena.3 since mathematical method had 
proved so successful in the investigation of natural phenomena, it 
seemed then quite reasonable for many modern thinkers to employ a 
mathematical method in other fields of investigation such as ethics, 
epistemology, or politics. Leading modern thinkers, such as, for instance, 
Grotius, Descartes, Hobbes, and spinoza sought to advance their 
respective philosophical projects in consonance with a mathematical 
method of exposition. but it is important to notice that, for these authors, 
the application of a mathematical method was not conceived in terms 
of measurements and quantification, as it occurred in astronomy or 
physics. to employ a mathematical method meant, rather, to proceed as a 
mathematician would do, namely: not to take any propositions for certain 
unless they were as evident as a mathematical axiom; and to construct 
knowledge on the basis of these self-evident propositions. Grotius, for 
instance, affirms the following in the De jure praedae:
Just as mathematicians customarily prefix to any concrete demonstration 
a preliminary statement of certain broad axioms on which all persons 
are easily agreed, I order that there may be some fixed point from which 
to trace the proof of what follows, so shall we point out certain rules 
and laws of the most general nature, presenting them as preliminary 
assumptions which need to be recalled rather than learnt for the first 
time, with the purpose of laying a foundation upon which our other 
conclusions may safely rest. 4
but what could be accepted as ‘self-evident’ in the context of 
a discussion on the moral foundations political authority? For the 
sceptic, it was by no means evident that he was endowed with a 
natural inclination towards the well-being of other individuals, nor 
that he was subjected to a natural or divine law which enjoined him   
to care for the interest of other individuals as much as he cared for 
his own interest. but could the sceptic reasonably doubt he had an   
 
 
3  see e.g. röD, W.  Geometrischer Geist und Naturrecht: Methodengeschichtliche 
Untersuchungen zur Staatsphilosophie im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Munich: bayerische 
Akademie der Wissenschaft, 1970); bUrtt, E. A. The Metaphysical Foundations of 
Modern Physical Science: A Historical and Critical Essay (London: routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1964).
4  GrOtIUs. Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, edited by Martine Julia van 
Ittersum (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006), ii, 17-18. this passage correponds to Grotius, 
De jure praedae commentarius, edited by H. G. Hamaker (de Hague: Nijhoff, 1868), 7. 
Henceforth I will use the abbreviation DJPC for De jure praedae commentarius, and 
CLPB for the English translation Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty.M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, moral scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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inclination towards his own well-being; or that he cared for his own   
interest, even admitting that he did not have any concern for the interest 
of his fellow-men? this, apparently, could not be denied by the sceptic. 
thus, the methodological strategy against the sceptic consisted in calling 
attention to a proposition which could be taken as immune to the sceptical 
onslaught, namely: that every individual (even the sceptic himself) has 
an intrinsic interest in the promotion of his own well-being. the thesis 
that individuals are essentially self-interested, and only occasionally 
inclined to meet the interest of other persons, should be taken, therefore, 
as a starting point – like an axiom in geometry – in the refutation of moral 
scepticism. Accordingly, an investigation into the question relative to 
the legitimacy of political authority should take as its starting point 
the self-interested character of human nature, for self-interestedness 
seemed to be the only feature of human nature the existence of which 
not even the sceptic could reasonably put into question. Even though 
Hobbes’ Leviathan immediately comes to mind when we consider this 
self-centered approach to the question of political authority, I would like 
to examine in this article, not Hobbes’, but Grotius’ contribution to this 
debate.
II
Grotius’ main works are De jure praedae and De jure belli ac pacis. the 
latter was published in 1625, while the former was only partially published 
during Grotius’ lifetime, in 1609, as Mare Liberum. the remaining of the 
text was discovered in 1864 and published four years later under the title 
of De jure praedae commentarius.5 the previously published work, Mare 
liberum, constitutes the twelfth chapter of De jure praedae. both in De jure 
praedae and in De jure belli ac pacis Grotius criticises the sceptical claim 
that justice, being but a human convention, could not be the object of a 
systematic philosophical investigation. right at the outset of De jure belli 
ac pacis, Grotius affirms that his intention is to refute moral scepticism. He 
has specially in mind here the ancient sceptic carneades who is reported   
 
 
5  see H. G. Hamaker’s Praefatio to Grotius, DJPC, v. see also tUcK, r. ‘Grotius and selden’, 
in The Cambridge History of Political Thought, 1450–1700, edited by J. H. burns and 
Mark Goldie (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1991), 504; tUcK, r. Philosophy 
and Government: 1572-1651 (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1993) 170; tUcK, 
r. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and Political Order from Grotius to 
Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 81; tUcK, r. ‘Introduction’, in Grotius: 
The Rights of War and Peace, edited by r. tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005),   
v. 1, xVII.M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, Moral Scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
  Veritas, v. 56, n. 3, set./dez. 2011, p. 145-166  149
to have argued, in two consecutive days before the roman senate in 155 
b.c., both for and then against the idea of justice. Grotius affirms the 
following:
but since it would be vain Undertaking to treat of right [de jure], if 
there is really no such a thing; it will be necessary, in order to show 
the Usefulness of our Work, and to establish it on solid Foundations, to 
confute here in a few Words so dangerous an Error. And that we may 
not engage with Multitude at once, let us assign them an Advocate. And 
who more proper for this Purpose than carneades, who arrived to such a 
Degree of Perfection, (the utmost his sect aimed at) [quod Academiae suae 
summum erat] that he could argue for or against truth, with the same 
Force of Eloquence [pro falso non minus quam pro vero vires eloquentiae 
posset intendere]? this Man having undertaking to dispute against 
Justice [justitiae], that kind of it, specially, which is the subject of this 
treatise, found no Argument stronger than this. Laws [jura] (says he) 
were instituted by Men for the sake of the Interest [utilitate]; and hence 
it is that they are different, not only in different countries, according to 
the Diversity of their Manners, but often in the same country, according 
to the times. As to that which is called NAtUrAL rIGHts, it is a mere 
chimera. Nature prompts all Men, and in general all Animals, to seek 
their own Advantage: so that either there is no Justice at all [nullam esse 
justitiam], or if there is any, it is extreme Folly, because it engages us to 
procure the Good of others, or our own Prejudice.6
the ability to argue both for and con the truth of a proposition, 
without necessarily committing oneself to either side, was seen in 
antiquity as a powerful rhetorical technique and, for this reason, it 
also constituted an important method in legal reasoning. cicero refers 
to this method of argumentation as an ability de omnibus rebus in 
contrarias partes disserendi or, more frequently, as the art of arguing   
in utramque partem.7 carneades’ two successive discourses before 
the roman senate, one for and the other against justice constitute the   
 
 
6  GrOtIUs. De iure belli ac pacis libri tres (Leiden: E. J. brill, 1939) Prol., v, 7. this 
passage correponds to Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, edited by r. tuck 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005) vol. 1, 79. Henceforth I will use the abbreviation DJBP 
for De iure belli ac pacis, and RWP for the English translation The Rights of War and   
Peace.
7  textual evidence for carneades’ discourses on justice is provided by cIcErO. Rep. iii. 
5-7. Yet, part of cicero’s original text is lost. the missing passage, with the account of 
carneades’ discourses on justice, is sometimes supplied with an extract from Lactantius 
(Divine institutes 5.14.3-5). see also cIcErO. De oratore 2, 155; cIcErO. Academica 1, 
137. For an historical account of carneades’ discourses before the roman senate, see 
WILKErsON, K. E. ‘carneades at rome: A problem of sceptical rhetoric’, Philosophy 
and Rhetoric, 21 (1988): 131-144.M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, moral scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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best example of the employment of in utramque partem arguments in   
antiquity.8  this  method  of  argumentation  was  revived  during 
renaissance, and it turned out to play an important role, not only in 
the context of legal training, but also in other fields of inquiry such 
as theology, politics, and epistemology.9 Arguments in utramque 
partem were also familiar to early modern advocates of scepticism 
such as charron and Montaigne.10 It was, actually, those modern 
philosophers, who made ample use of ancient sceptical arguments 
against the tenability of the idea of justice, rather than the historical 
carneades, that Grotius had in mind in the Prolegomena to De jure belli   
8  see e.g. GOODrIcH, P . ‘Law’, in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, edited by t. sloane (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 422-3; EIsELE, r. ‘skeptizismus’, in Historisches 
Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, edited by G. Ueding (tubingen: Max Niemeyer, 2007), vol. 8, 
932; NIcKAU, K. ‘Peripateticorum consuetudo, Zu cic. Tusc. 2,9’, in Antik Rhetorik und 
ihre Rezeption, edited by s. Döpp (suttgart: Franz steiner, 1998) 17 and 22; GrANAtELLI, 
r. ‘L’in utramque partem disserendi exercitatio nell’evoluzione del pensiero retorico e 
fiosofico dell’antiquità’, Vichiana, 1 (1990): 165-181; LEONArDt, J. Ciceros Kritik der 
Philosophenschulen (Munich: beck, 1999) 14; rEMEr, G. ‘Humanism, liberalism, and 
the sceptical case for religious tolerance’, Polity, 25 (1992): 25.
9  see scHIFFMAN, Z. s. On the Threshold of Modernity: Relativism in the French 
Renaissance (baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) 16: ‘In elementary 
classes, they tested each other on grammatical points; in more advanced classes, 
they disputed in utramque partem. The teacher would customarily assign one 
group of students the task of defending a proposition and another group that of 
attacking it (...) Students thus became skilled in the presentation of knowledge; they 
learned to think and to speak in utramque partem.’; ALtMAN, J. The Tudor Play 
of Mind: Rhetorical Inquiry and the Development of Elizabethan Drama (berkeley: 
University of califoronia Press, 1978) 34: ‘The habit of arguing in utramque 
partem permeated virtually all areas of intellectual life. Erasmus even extended 
it to Scriptural interpretation.’ see also ArAUJO, M. de. Scepticism, Freedom, and 
Autonomy: A Study of The Moral Foundations of Descartes’ Theory of Knowledge (New 
York/berlin: De Gruyter, 2003) 41-44; KAHN,  V.  Rhetoric, Prudence, and Skepticism 
in the Renaissance (Ithaca: cornell University Press, 1985) 20-22 and 67); MOss, 
J. D. ‘rhetoric in renaissance language and literature’, in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, 
edited by t. sloane (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 686; sKINNEr, q. Reason 
and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (cambridge: cambridge University Press,   
1996) 27.
10  scHIFFMAN, Z. s. On the Threshold of Modernity: Relativism in the French 
Renaissance (baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991) 54: ‘...Cicero denied 
that one could ever attain truth or certainty, thus limiting all knowledge to probability 
or verisimilitude revealed by discoursing in utramque partem. This Ciceronian attitude, 
eclipsed during the Middle Ages, was subsequently revived in the Renaissance. Yet 
Montaigne used discourse in utramque partem to demonstrate that one could 
not even establish verisimilitude in human affairs...’ see also KAHN,  V.  Rhetoric, 
Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance (Ithaca: cornell University Press, 
1985) 115: ‘For while Montaigne borrows the in utramque partem method of arguing 
from Academic skeptic and the classical orator, he does not share their conviction 
that this form of argument will allow one to arrive at some approximation of the 
truth.’M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, Moral Scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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ac pacis.11 In this regard, it is also noteworthy that Johann Gronovius, 
an early editor and commentator of De jure belli ac pacis, explicitly 
refers to the ability of arguing in utramque partem in his commentary 
to the passage quoted above, where Grotius first refers to Academic 
scepticism.12 Gronovius had the opportunity to meet Grotius personally 
about ten years after the publication of De jure belli ac pacis and to discuss 
its content with him.13 It is reasonable to assume, then, that Gronovius 
also comprehended Grotius’ refutation of moral scepticism as an attempt 
to criticise the use of arguments in utramque partem in the context of 
moral and political discussions. 
For the sceptic, there are reasons to suppose that laws and justice 
are but human conventions. Laws and justice, accordingly, would be 
the result of self-interest (utilitate); the so-called ‘natural laws’ on the 
other hand, would not really exist (jus autem naturale esse nullum). Yet, 
given the sceptic’s assumption that we can always argue in utramque 
partem, there were equal reasons to suppose that justice and laws 
could be more than simple human conventions. As I intend to show, 
Grotius’ refutation of scepticism does not consist in simply rejecting 
one of carneades’ discourses (the discourse against justice) in order 
to defend the other discourse (the one in favour of justice). Grotius’ 
intention is, rather, to neutralise the bewildering effect the discourse 
in utramque partem had exerted since antiquity in the discussions 
about laws and justice. Grotius’ objective, thus, consists in showing   
 
11  tUcK, r. ‘Grotius, carneades, and Hobbes’, Grotiana, 4 (1983): 44: ‘To attack Carneades 
in 1604 or 1625 was not of course simply to attack a long-dead classical philosopher. It 
was primarily to attack the modern sceptics whose appeal to contemporary intellectuals 
was profound – and with whom the youthful Grotius himself seems to have had some 
sympathy.’ see also tUcK, r. ‘the “modern” theory of natural law’, in The Languages 
of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, edited Anthony Pagden (cambridge: 
cambridge University Press, 1987) 109; tUcK, r. ‘Optics and sceptics: the philosophical 
foundations of Hobbes’ political thought’, in Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern 
Europe, edited by Edmund Leites (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 2002) 
239-41; scHNEEWIND, J. b. Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant: An Anthology 
(cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1990), vol. 1, 89; scHNEEWIND, J. b. The 
Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (cambridge: cambridge 
University Press, 1998) 70-1; bUcKLE, s. Natural Law and the Theory of Property 
(Oxford: clarendon Press, 1991) 17-18; HArrIsON, r. Hobbes, Locke, and Confusion’s 
Masterpiece: An Examination of Seventeenth-Century Political Philosophy (cambridge: 
cambridge University Press, 2003) 40.
12  GrONOVIUs, J. In: GrOtIUs. De iure belli ac pacis libri tres, Prolegomena, v (Amsterdam: 
Janssonio-Waesbergiorum, 1689): ‘Academia: Academicae sectae, quae ex instituto nihil 
definiebat, et assensum quidem sustinebat, de omnibus autem quaestionibus probabiliter 
in utramque partem disputabat.’ 
13  see GrONOVIUs, Johann Friedrich. In: Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie (Leipzig: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1879) vol. 9, 721.M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, moral scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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that justice and laws on the one hand, and self-interest on the other, are 
not incompatible with each other. 
III
before examining Grotius’ refutation of scepticism, it is important to 
notice that Grotius was not the only major modern philosopher interested 
in criticising the use of in utramque partem arguments in the context of 
moral and political discussions. quentin skinner, for instance, points out 
that Hobbes was also interested, both in De Cive and in Leviathan, in 
overcoming the ongoing rhetorical disputes which would have precluded 
the progress of ‘civil science’. these disputes were conducted, according 
to skinner, in consonance with the classical model of in utramque partem 
arguments, inspired by carneades’ discourses for and against justice. 
On the other hand, skinner denies that Hobbes’ effort to criticise the 
use of in utramque partem method of argumentation had any significant 
connection with the attempt to refute scepticism in the moral and political 
debate. According to skinner, Hobbes was concerned, rather, with the 
‘rhetorical culture of renaissance humanism.’14 In a similar vein, thomas 
Mautner acknowledges that Grotius criticises the use of in utramque 
partem method in the context of moral and political questions. On the 
other hand, Mautner denies, like skinner, that this bears any relationship 
with the problem of scepticism.15 Mautner’s thesis is that Grotius was not 
concerned with scepticism, but, rather, with Realpolitik, i.e. with ‘realism’ 
in international relations.16 skinner and Mautner seek to dissociate the 
use of in utramque partem arguments from the problem of scepticism by 
alleging that there is no textual evidence, either in the works of Hobbes’ 
or Grotius’, which corroborate the thesis that the problem of scepticism 
was a relevant question for these philosophers.17 but is this a good 
argument?
14  sKINNEr, q. Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (cambridge: cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 299-300.
15  MAUtNEr, t. ‘Grotius and the skeptics’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 66 (2005): 590: 
‘What made Carneades the natural choice was his renown as an orator, underscored by 
his success in arguing with great persuasive power in utramque partem. He was chosen 
because he was the one capable of making the best case for the opinion that Grotius 
wanted to refute.’
16  MAUtNEr, t. ‘Grotius and the skeptics’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 66 (2005): 588 and 591.
17  this argument is also defended by ZAGOrIN, P . ‘Hobbes without Grotius’, History of 
Political Thought, 21 (2000): 24; KOrKMAN, P . ‘barbeyrac on scepticism and modernity’, 
Grotiana, 20/21 (1999/2000): 83; tIErNEY, b. The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural 
Rights, Natural Law and Church Law 1150-1625 (Atlanta: scholar Press, 1997) 321; sHAVEr, 
r. ‘Grotius on scepticism and self-interest’, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 78 
(1996): 27-47. M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, Moral Scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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consider, for instance, Descartes. right at the outset of the Meditations, 
in the Dedicatory letter to the Sorbonne, Descartes also criticises the 
method of argumentation in utramque partem. He opposes geometry to 
philosophy, and complains that, while in the former we can find exact 
demonstrations, in the latter ‘there is nothing about which it cannot 
be argued either way’ (‘... nihil esse de quo non possit in utramque 
partem disputari...’).18 Like Grotius and Hobbes, Descartes thought of 
mathematics as a kind of knowledge from which a reliable method of 
investigation could be derived. Accordingly, the mathematical method, 
rather than the in utramque partem method of argumentation, should 
be employed in the context of an investigation into the foundations of 
knowledge. the application of a mathematical method could be, then, 
turned against the sceptical doubts Descartes himself had raised in 
the First Meditation. the problem, however, is that Descartes does 
not make any overt reference to the problem of scepticism in the 
Meditations. If the argument offered by skinner and Mautner were 
sound, we would also have to accept that, in spite of Descartes’ straight 
reference to the use of in utramque partem arguments in the Meditations, 
Descartes is not interested at all in the problem of scepticism. but in the 
replies to the Meditations, after having been criticised for advancing a 
sceptical position, Descartes makes a clear statement of his intention 
not to defend, but to refute the sceptic.19 
As to the thesis that Grotius was interested in opposing realism 
in international relations, it can hardly be questioned. Grotius’ main 
works are amongst the most important contributions in the history of 
international law theories. And one of the reasons for the resurgence 
of philosophical interest in Grotius’ writings stems precisely from 
the attempt to advance an alternative to realism or Realpolitik in   
international relations.20 but we should not conclude from Grotius’   
 
18  DEscArtEs. Oeuvres de Descartes, edited by c. Adam and P . tannery (Paris: Vrin, 
1996) vol. 7, 5. this passage corresponds to Descartes, The Philosophical Writtings 
of Descartes, translated by J. cottingham, r. stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (cambridge: 
cambridge University Press, 1993), vol. 2, 5. Henceforth I will use the abbreviation 
At for the French edition of Descartes’ works, and csM for the English edition. A 
further reference to the use of in utramque partem arguments appears in the Fourth 
Meditation, At, vol. 7, 57 (csM, vol. 2, 40). For an examination of Descartes’ criticism 
of in utramque partem arguments, see ArAUJO, M. de. Scepticism, Freedom, and 
Autonomy: A Study of The Moral Foundations of Descartes’ Theory of Knowledge (New 
York/berlin: De Gruyter, 2003) 40-72.
19  DEscArtEs. At, vol. 7, 548-549 (csM, vol. 2, 374-5). see also At, vol. 7, 476-477 (csM, 
vol. 2, 321); At, vol. 7, 130 (csM, vol. 2, 94).
20  see e.g. bULL, H. Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (columbia: 
columbia University Press, 1977). bull and other authors related to the so-called English 
school of international relations are sometimes referred to as “Neo-grotians”. M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, moral scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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criticism of realism that Grotius was not interested at all in the problem 
of scepticism. For realism itself may be considered a form of scepticism 
relative to the existence of compelling moral principles in the ambit 
of international relations.21 Why, after all, should one state curb the 
pursuit of its own interest, so as to meet the interest of other states, 
if, as carneades had put it, there were neither natural laws nor justice 
(nullam esse justitiam)? Grotius’ alternative to realism in international 
relations, therefore, cannot be dissociated from his attempt to refute 
moral scepticism.
IV
In order to refute scepticism, Grotius seeks to conciliate two 
apparently conflicting theses. (1) the first thesis is that human beings 
are naturally self-interested; they pursue firstly the implementation 
of their own interest, and only secondarily do they also seek to meet 
the interest of other individuals. (2) the second thesis is that human 
beings have a natural propensity to live in society. Grotius commits 
himself to both theses in several passages from De jure belli ac pacis 
and from De jure praedae. but it is important to stress that Grotius is 
not interested in endorsing one thesis to the detriment of the other 
one. Martin Harvey, for instance, argues, too, that there is ‘textual 
evidence’ for both theses scattered in Grotius’ works. but Harvey 
seems to assume that a correct interpretation of Grotius’ argument 
would establish which thesis Grotius would have supported after all.22 
since Grotius is trying to refute the sceptical use of arguments in 
utramque partem, it is no wonder, then, that we find textual evidence 
for both the first and the second theses. but Grotius’ point against the 
sceptic is that, despite appearance to the contrary, the two theses are   
 
21  see e.g. FOrDE, s. ‘classical realism’, in Traditions of International Ethics, edited by 
terry Nardin and David Mapel (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1993) 62: 
‘Realism appears against this background as a skepticism concerning the relevance of 
moral categories to the relations among states.’; and ibid. 69: ‘For Machiavelli, realism 
in the international arena is inseparable from moral skepticism that extends to the very 
foundations of political life.’ see also WILKErsON, K. E. ‘carneades at rome: A problem 
of sceptical rhetoric’, Philosophy and Rhetoric, 21 (1988): 134: ‘An account of Carneades’ 
speeches must also consider his philosophical position. He was a serious sceptic. That 
is, he did not merely attack the dogmatists with sceptical arguments but developed 
a sceptical epistemology that was possibly also the basis for a moral theory (…) His 
arguments are directed in particular to questions of international justice.’ 
22  HArVEY, M. ‘Grotius and Hobbes’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 14 
(2006): 32: ‘What of Grotius: does he remain wedded to Aristotle or does he pave the 
way for Hobbes? Textual evidence points in both directions but the latter reading would 
ultimately seem to prove persuasive.’M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, Moral Scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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compatible with each other. the first thesis is clearly stated, for instance, 
in the following passage from De jure praedae:
tHEsIs 1 (about self-interestedness in human nature)
therefore, since God fashioned creation and willed its existence, every 
individual part thereof has received from Him certain natural properties 
whereby that existence may be preserved and each part may be guided 
for its own good, in conformity, one might say, with the fundamental law 
inherent in its origin. From this fact the old poets and philosophers have 
rightly deduced that love, whose primary force and action are directed to 
self-interest, is the first principle of the whole natural order. consequently, 
Horace should not be censured for saying, in imitation of the Academics, 
that expedience might perhaps be called the mother of justice and equity. 
For all things in nature, as cicero repeatedly insists, are tenderly regardful 
of self, and seek their own happiness and security.23
the second thesis, which apparently contradicts the first one, is 
stated, for instance, in the following passages from De jure belli ac pacis: 
tHEsIs 2 (about human natural sociability)
Now amongst the things peculiar to Man, is his Desire of society 
[appetitus societatis], that is, a certain Inclination to live with those 
of his own Kind, not in any Manner whatever, but peaceably, and in a 
community regulated according to the best of his Understanding…24
[…]
this sociability, which we have now described in general, or this care 
of maintaining society [societatis custodia] in a Manner conformable to 
the Light of human Understanding, is the Fountain of right, properly so 
called; to which belongs the Abstaining from that which is another’s, 
and the restitution of what we have of another’s, or of the Profit we 
have made by it, the Obligation of fulfilling Promises, the reparation of 
a Damage done through our own Default, and the Merit of Punishment 
among Men.25
23  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 21 (DJPC, ii, 9). the Latin text reads: ‘Cum igitur res conditas Deus esse 
fecerit et esse voluerit, proprietates quasdam naturales singulis indidit, quibus ipsum 
illud esse conservaretur et quibus ad bonum suum unumquodque, velut ex prima originis 
lege, duceretur. Unde principium totius naturalis ordinis recte poetae et philosophi 
veteres amorem statuerunt, cujus prima vis primaque actio reciproca est in se ipsum. 
Qua ratione culpandum non est quod secutus Academicos Horatius utilitatem justi et 
aequi prope matrem dixit. Omnis enim natura, ut plurimus locis Cicero inculcat, diligens 
est sui seque salvam ac beatam vult...’ 
24 G rOtIUs. RWP, 79 (DJBP, 7). the Latin text reads: ‘Inter haec autem quae homini sunt 
propria, est appetitus societatis, id est communitatis, non qualiscunque, sed tranquillae 
et pro sui intellectus modo ordinatae cum his qui sui sunt generis.’ 
25  GrOtIUs. RWP, 85-6 (DJBP, 9). the Latin text reads: ‘Haec vero quam rudi modo iam 
expressimus societatis custodia humano intellectui conveniens, fons est eius iuris, quod 
proprie tali nomine appellatur: quo pertinent alieni abstinentia, et si quid alieni habemus 
aut lucri inde fecerimus restitutio, promissorum implendorum obligatio, damni culpa dati 
reparatio, et poenae inter homines meritum.’ see also GrOtIUs. CLPB, 26 (DJPC, 12).M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, moral scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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If thesis 1 is true, then it follows that there is no ‘natural justice’, for 
thesis 1 says that human beings are naturally moved by self-interest, 
and not towards the well-being of other individuals. the truth of thesis 
1, therefore, entails that the so-called demands of justice cannot be 
grounded in any alleged ‘natural inclination’ individuals would have to 
aim at the well-being of other individuals irrespective of considerations 
about the furtherance of their own interest. the first implication to be 
derived from thesis 1, therefore, is that justice is not a natural state of 
affairs. Justice, as Montaigne puts the matter, is a matter of human 
convention.26 Grotius seems not to oppose this first implication.27 He 
opposes, rather, a second implication that might be derived from thesis 
1, namely: that it would be irrational (stultitiam) to abide by human 
conventions establishing what counts as just or unjust. the second 
implication is presented in the form of a dilemma, formulated at the 
end of the passage quoted above, where Grotius refers to carneades’ 
discourses: ‘…either there is no Justice at all, or if there is any, it is 
extreme Folly [stultitiam], because it engages us to procure the Good of 
others, to our own Prejudice.’  28 some other major modern philosophers 
also called attention to this apparent conflict between the demands of 
justice, understood as a simple human convention, and the pursuit of 
self-interest. In an early text on natural law, Leibniz, for instance, argues 
that the endorsement of principles of justice without concern for the 
fulfilment of self-interest would be irrational (stultitiam): ‘Ego suppono 
cum Carneade (et Hobbius consentit) Iustitiam sine utilitate propria (sive 
praesente sive futura) summam esse stultitiam…’  29 thus, in order to refute 
modern moral scepticism, Grotius has to show that the second implication 
does not obtain, i.e. he must show that the demands of justice do not 
conflict with the implementation of one’s own interest. Grotius commits 
himself, then, to thesis 2: human beings are also moved by a ‘desire of 
society’. but is this step coherent? Does not the truth of thesis 2 entail 
that thesis 1 is false? Grotius’ strategy to dispel the apparent conflict   
 
26  MONtAIGNE. Les Essais (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 1965), vol. 2, 23: ‘Les lois de la 
conscience que nous dison naître de nature, naissant de la coutume.’ 
27  cf. tUcK, r. ‘Grotius, carneades, and Hobbes’, Grotiana, 4 (1983): 52: ‘The crucial move 
which Grotius made was to accept at this point the force of the sceptical argument, and to 
concede that indeed the only universal human trait, and therefore the only one which God 
could legitimaly be thought of as instilling in all men, was self-interest.’. cf. also tUcK, r. 
‘the ‘modern’ theory of natural law’, in The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern 
Europe, edited Anthony Pagden (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1987) 115.
28 G rOtIUs. RWP, 79 (DJBP, 7). the Latin text reads: ‘proinde aut nullam esse iustitiam; aut 
si sit aliqua, summam esse stultitiam, quoniam sibi noceat alienis commodis consulens.’
29 L EIbNIZ. Frühe Schriften zum Naturrecht, edited by H. Zimmerman and H. busche 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2003) 328.M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, Moral Scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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between thesis 1 and thesis 2 becomes clearer once we have understood 
which arguments he offers for both theses.
Grotius’ argument for thesis 1, relative to the self-interested aspect of 
human nature, involves the assumption that God created humans beings, 
and that God wants them to preserve their own existence. the pursuit 
of self-interest is natural to the extent that it stems from God’s will. And 
because God’s will has for human beings the force of law, two ‘natural 
laws’ (leges juris naturalis) may be established.30 the ‘first law’ (lex I) is 
the following: ‘It shall be permissible to defend one’s own life and to shun 
that which threatens to prove injurious’ the second law (lex II) affirms: 
‘It shall be permissible to acquire for oneself, and to retain, those things 
which are useful for life.’31 Grotius argues, then, that even the sceptics 
(the Academici) would accept the validity of the first and second laws 
of nature.32 For the first and second laws aim solely at the furtherance 
‘of one’s own good’ (de bono suo), irrespective of what happens to other 
individuals.33 
but now a problem arises: how would human interaction look like if 
every human being were constantly intent on doing, without any further 
restrictions, what the first and second laws of nature determine? Human 
interaction would be characterised by conflict rather than by harmony. In 
order to comply with the first law of nature, so as to ensure that my life 
is not ever endangered by other individuals, I could adopt, for example, 
the pre-emptive strategy of always threatening other individuals before 
being threatened by them in the first instance. In like manner, in order to 
act in accordance with the second law of nature I could take from other 
individuals, and retain for myself, whatever I judged to be useful for my 
own life. the problem, however, is that the unrestrained compliance with 
the first and second laws of nature would unavoidably lead to conflict and, 
possibly, to human destruction, rather than to human preservation. thus, 
even though the first and second laws of nature command individuals 
to act upon God’s will (to promote one’s own preservation), these laws 
alone are not sufficient to guarantee the fulfilment of God’s will. For this 
reason, Grotius assumes that self-interestedness cannot be the only   
 
30  cf. GrOtIUs. CLPB, 19 (DJPC, 7-8) where Grotius formulates the first ‘rule” from which 
he derives the first law of nature: ‘What God has shown to be His Will, that is law. the 
Latin text runs: ‘Quod Deus se velle significaverit, id est jus.’ 
31 G rOtIUs. CLPB, 23 (DJPC, 10). the Latin text reads: ‘Ex hac igitur conjugatione 
emergunt leges juris naturalis duae. Prior: Vitam tueri et declinare nocitura liceat. Altera: 
Adjungere sibi quae ad vivendum sunt utilia eaque retinere liceat.’
32  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 23 (DJPC, 11).
33 G rOtIUs. CLPB, 27 (DJPC, 13). cf. ArAUJO, M. de. ‘Hugo Grotius, contractualism, and 
the concept of private property: an institutionalist interpretation’, History of Philosophy 
Quarterly, 26 (2009): 354-356.M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, moral scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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distinguishing feature of human nature. since God wants human beings 
to preserve their own lives, there must be two further laws of nature 
which restrict compliance with the first and second laws of nature. 
the third and fourth laws of nature, relate, differently from the first and 
second laws of nature, to the well-being ‘of other individuals’ (de bono 
alieno). the third law of nature affirms the following: ‘Let no one inflict 
injury upon his fellow.’ the fourth law of nature affirms: ‘Let no one seize 
possession of that which has been taken into possession of another.’34 While 
the validity of the first and second laws of nature allows us to formulate 
thesis 1, the validity of the third and fourth laws of nature allows us to 
formulate thesis 2. but, for Grotius, they are both true. 
In order to elucidate how the first and the second laws of nature, on 
the one hand, relate to the third and fourth laws of nature, on the other 
hand, Grotius points out that human beings are moved by two basic 
kinds of love: love for oneself and love for others.35 the capacity of love 
for oneself is presupposed by the thesis 1, while the capacity of love for 
others is presupposed by thesis 2. because human beings are moved 
by love for others, they are also able to live a peaceful life, as though 
it resulted from a kind of assent to a ‘permanent covenant’ (aeterno 
foedere) among themselves.36 However, it is important to notice now that 
Grotius accepts thesis 2 with an important qualification. Friendliness 
towards other individuals differs from the disposition to promote one’s 
own interest in that the former involves the use of reason. While love 
for oneself is a kind of ‘desire’ (cupidinis), love for others is a kind of 
‘friendliness’ (amicitiae).37 It is mutual friendliness, indeed, which   
 
34  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 27 (DJPC, 13-14). the Latin text reads: ‘Ex regula igitur prima et 
secunda leges duae procedunt de bono alieno, quae prioribus de bono suo respondent, 
easque justo limite circumscribunt. Una: Ne quis alterum laedat; Altera: Ne quis occupet 
alteri occupata.’
35  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 24 (DJPC, 11): ‘Love, then, is twofold: love for oneself and love for others. 
In the former aspect it is known as “desire”; in the latter, as friendliness.’ the Latin 
text reads: ‘Duplex itaque est amor, sui et alterius, quorum ille cupidinis, hic amicitiae 
dicitur.’
36  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 24 (DJPC, 11): ‘But God judged that there would be insufficient provision 
for the preservation of His work, if He commended to each individual’s care only the 
safety of that particular individual, without also willing that one created being should 
have regard for the welfare of his fellow beings, in such a way that all might be linked in 
mutual harmony as if by an everlasting covenant.’ the Latin text reads: ‘At vero non satis 
conservationi operum suorum provisum Deus credit, si suam duntaxat incolumitatem 
cuique commendaret, nisi et rem alteram alterius commodis vellet consulere, ut cuncta 
inter se velut aeterno foedere consentirent.’
37  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 24 (DJPC, 11): ‘... this manifestation of love [sc. friendship] burns most 
brightly in man, as in one who is particularly endowed not only with the affections 
shared in common with other creatures but also with the sovereign attribute of reason.’ 
the Latin text reads: ‘… in homine vero luculentissima, ut cui praeter communes cum 
caeteris affectiones peculiariter concessa sit ratio illa imperatrix.’M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, Moral Scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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enables individuals to live peacefully in society. but friendliness itself may 
be considered a natural human feature only to the extent that reason is 
the ‘supreme attribute’ of human beings. In our relationship with other 
individuals we are not simply moved by a natural desire to act friendly. 
We also understand that other individuals will not treat us friendly unless 
we are also friendly to them. We understand, moreover, that to react 
with friendliness to a threatening party may be self-damaging, and this 
runs counter to the first law of nature. In De jure praedae, Grotius calls 
attention to two passages from seneca in order to elucidate this point. the 
first passage affirms simply what is already contained in thesis 2: ‘… we 
are born for a life of fellowship. Society, too, can be kept safe from harm only 
by love and watchful care for its component parts [sc. the individuals].’38 
He adds, then, a further passage from seneca: ‘Security must be obtained 
by offering security in exchange’ (Securitas securitate mutua paciscenda 
est).39 the occurrence of the verb pacisco in the original text is significant, 
for it is the word from which the noun ‘pact’ stems. the basic idea here 
is that one’s interest in obtaining security for oneself cannot be fulfilled 
unless one is also willing to offer security in return, as if mutual violence 
among self-interested individuals were forbidden for the sake of a pact. 
such a pact can be actually made: self-interested individuals can establish 
a political community in the context of which a human convention 
restricting the unconstrained maximization of one’s own interest would 
acquire the status of positive law. Grotius agrees with the sceptic that, 
in this context, justice would be only a human convention. It would be 
valid only for the citizens of this political community. but, on the other 
hand, against the sceptic, Grotius also argues that this does not mean 
that there cannot be restrictions to the fulfilment of self-interest beyond 
the borders of a specific political community. Grotius’ point against the 
sceptic is that the interest in one’s own security is such a basic feature 
of human nature, and the perception that one cannot obtain security for 
oneself unless one offers security in return is so widespread, that we 
can consider ourselves, as it were, ‘co-nationals’ or ‘kindred’ (cognatio) 
of a single ‘world-state’ (mundi civitas).40 Accordingly, there is a kind of   
 
38  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 26-27 (DJPC, 13). the quotation at issue is from seneca, On Anger, ii. 
xxxi. 7-8. the Latin text reads: ‘...quia ad coetum geniti sumus. Salva autem esse societas, 
nisi amore et custodia partium non potest.’
39  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 27 (DJPC, 13). the quotation at issue is from seneca, De Clementia, i. 
xix. 5. 
40  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 27 (DJPC, 13). Grotius affirms after the quotation from seneca: ‘Herein 
lies that brotherhood of man, that world state, commended to us so frequently and so 
enthusiastically by the ancient philosophers and particularly by the Stoics…’ the Latin 
text reads: ‘Haec est illa hominum inter se cognatio, illa mundi civitas, quam tot tantisque 
praeconiis veteres philosophi nobis commandant, praesertim Stoici…’ M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, moral scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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justice which holds across the borders of different political communities. 
Grotius calls this kind of justice the ‘law of nations’ (jus gentium). He 
concludes, then, that there must be a middle term between the sheer 
unrestrained pursuit of self-interest and the diversity of constraints which 
can be imposed on human being on the grounds of human conventions. 
As he puts it in the in Jure praedae: 
the foregoing observations show how erroneously the Academics – those 
masters of ignorance – have argued in refutation of justice, that the kind 
derived from nature looks solely to personal advantage, while civil justice 
is based not upon nature but merely upon opinion [opinione]; for they 
have overlooked that intermediate aspect of justice [mediam justitiam] 
which is characteristic of humankind [humano generi].41
‘Middle justice’ is called ‘middle’ because it is neither a simple 
convention (opinione) nor the expression of sheer personal interest 
(utilitatem). It is more than a simple convention because its validity is not 
circumscribed to the bounds of a specific political community. It concerns, 
rather, the whole humankind (humano generi). Yet, it is grounded in 
nature to the extent that any individual is expected to assent to norms 
which limit the unconstrained maximization of his or her own interest 
in order to meet the interest of other individuals. In the De jure belli ac 
pacis Grotius returns to this point and criticises carneades for having 
failed to recognise the existence of the ‘law of nations’ (jus gentium), i.e. 
a kind of norm which is neither ‘civil law’ (jus civile) nor ‘natural law’ 
(jus naturale).42
V
As we can see, Grotius accepts thesis 2 because human dispositions 
such as ‘desire of society’ (appetitus societatis), ‘care of society’ (societatis 
custodia), ‘love for others’ (amor alterius), or ‘friendliness’ (amicitiae)   
 
 
41  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 27 (DJPC, 13). the Latin text reads: ‘Unde apparet quam non recte 
magistri ignorantiae Academici contra justitiam disputaverint, eam quae natura est ad 
utilitatem duntaxat suam ducere, civilem vero non ex natura esse, sed ex opinione. Hanc 
enim mediam justitiam, quae humano generi propria est, omittebant.’
42  GrOtIUs. RWP, 94 (DJBP, 12-13). Even though Grotius explicitly affirms, in De jure bellic 
ac pacis, that jus gentium is not a kind of natural law, in De jure praedae he seems willing 
to admit that jus gentium is part of the natural law. cf. GrOtIUs. CLPB, 25 (DJPC, 12): 
‘Many persons, indeed, have chosen to call that very accord [sc. the mutual accord of 
nations] the secondary law of nature, or primary law of nations.’ the Latin text reads: 
‘Placuit autem plerisque hunc ipsum consensum [sc. consensus gentium] jus naturae 
secundarium, seu jus gentium primarium appellare.’M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, Moral Scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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prevent individuals to pursue the maximization of their own interests   
without restrictions. the absence of restrictions in the pursuit of self-
interest would be, indeed, deleterious the very implementation of self 
interest. For this reason, Grotius’ acceptance of thesis 2, as many authors 
have already pointed out, cannot be taken as an endorsement of the 
traditional Aristotelian and thomist idea according to which human 
beings would be ‘political animal.’43 the acceptance of this thesis in 
antiquity and in middle age entailed that individuals should accept 
the constraints of their political community lest they should be acting 
against their own nature. the political authority, then, was considered 
legitimate in so far as it enjoined individuals to live a life which was 
considered to be in accordance with human nature. As benjamin constant 
later remarked, one’s being free, in the context of antiquity, meant to be 
entitled to participate in the decisions of one’s own political community. 
but one’s being free was compatible with the assumption that the 
community itself was entitled to curtail to a great extent one’s ‘individual 
freedom’ in such matters as, for instance, the choice for a spouse, or 
the adoption of a specific religious creed.44 Actually, the very idea of 
‘individual freedom’ did not exist in the context of pre-modern political 
thought. this idea emerged gradually, among other reasons, out of the 
widespread acceptance of the sceptical claim that we cannot establish 
by rational means a particular conception of the good life as being   
the only conception which is suitable for a human being. thus, given   
the impossibility to demonstrate which life is, after all, the best kind   
 
43  tUcK, r. ‘Grotius, carneades, and Hobbes’, Grotiana, 4 (1983): 53: ‘It is important also 
to stress that according to Grotius this natural sense of society with all other men does 
not entail any obligation to help them, or to foster the kind of moral life which Aristotle 
envisaged for his zw/on politikovn.; HAAKONssEN, K. ‘Hugo Grotius and the history of 
political thought’, Political Theory, 13 (1985): 249: ‘Already Aristotle had sought the 
foundation of law in people’s social character. But in Aristotle it is a politically organized 
society that our nature prescribes for us, whereas in Grotius it is mere human sociability 
that is prescribed, with the question of the organization of the ensuing society being a 
further one.’ see also tUcK, r. ‘Grotius and selden’, in The Cambridge History of Political 
Thought, 1450-1700, edited by J. H. burns and Mark Goldie (cambridge: cambridge 
University Press, 1991) 507; scHNEEWIND, J. b. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of 
Modern Moral Philosophy (cambridge: cambridge University Press, 1998) 71-72; GOUGH, 
J. W. The Social Contract: A Critical Study of its Development (Oxford: At the clarendon 
Press, 1967) 80-1; scHNEIDErs, W.  Naturrecht und Liebesethik: zur Geschichte 
der praktischen Philosophie im Hinblick auf Christian Thomasius (New York: Olms,   
1971) 70-2.
44  cONstANt, b. ‘the liberty of the ancients compared to that of the moderns’, in Benjamin 
Constant: Political Writings, edited by b. Fontana (cambridge: cambridge University 
Press, 1988) 310-311, first published in 1816. see also MAcPHErsON, c. b. The Political 
Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1964) 263-278.
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of life for a human being to live, any conception of the good life could 
be considered acceptable, as long as it is pursued voluntarily, i.e. 
in accordance with one’s own will. Grotius granted the sceptic that 
individuals may diverge as to the things they will, and that this divergence 
cannot be settled by simply pointing out that what one actually wills is 
not in accordance with human being’s ‘natural inclination.’ Yet, that 
every human being is endowed with the faculty of willing was a thesis 
that, for Grotius, the sceptic would have to accept. the existence of 
one’s own ‘will’ seemed, then, to be the only thing which remained 
unquestionable, even when the existence of such things as ‘natural 
inclinations’, ‘divine commandments’, or ‘laws of conscience’ were put into 
doubt. 
For this reason, the political community should not be ruled by any 
kind of normative instance other than the individuals’ own will. by the 
same token, any political community should be entitled to determine by 
itself the ‘form of government’ (gubernationis formam) under which it 
prefers to live, as long this form of government resulted ‘from the will’ (ex 
voluntate) of its members, and not from the will of some foreign power. 
As Grotius affirms in De jure belli ac pacis:
but as there are several Ways of Living [vivendi genera], some better than 
others, and every one may chuse [cuique liberum est] which he pleases 
of all those sorts; so a People may chuse what Form of Government 
[gubernationis formam] they please: Neither is the right which the 
sovereign has over his subjects to be measured by the Extent of this or 
that Form, of which divers Men have divers Opinions [qua de re diversa 
diversorum sunt judicia], but by the Extent of the Will of those who 
conferred it upon him [ex voluntate].45
An individual is free to the extent that he can choose a conception 
of the good life for himself or a form of government along with other 
individuals with whom he can form a political community. Nevertheless, 
Grotius admits that the sceptic could carry on doubting the existence of 
a particular conception of the good life, or a specific form of government, 
which every person supposedly should endorse as the only ones suitable 
for human beings. In De jure praedae, Grotius calls ‘natural liberty’ 
(naturalis libertas) this individual claim for the pursuit of one’s own   
 
45  GrOtIUs. RWP, 262, (DJBP, 102). the Latin text reads: ‘Sicut autem multa sunt vivendi 
genera, alterum altero praestantius, et cuique liberum est ex tot generibus id eligere 
quod ipsi placet; ita et populus eligere potest qualem vult gubernationis formam: neque 
ex praestantia huius aut illius formae, qua de re diversa diversorum sunt iudicia, sed ex 
voluntate ius metiendum est.’M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, Moral Scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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interest.46 In so far as Grotius acknowledges that the individual’s will 
is the only authoritative instance one can appeal to in the attempt to 
establish one’s conception of the good life, or one’s project for a form of 
government, he shares with the sceptic a fundamental claim, namely: 
that there are so many different opinions (judicia) in this regard, that 
we cannot expect to settle once and for all these questions by simply 
pointing out a particular conception of the good life, or a particular form 
of government, regardless of individual preferences. In this regard, 
Grotius’ answer to the sceptic may sound rather disappointing, for he 
seems to stand on the sceptical side of the dispute. Like Descartes, 
Grotius sought to refute the sceptic by starting from sceptical premises. 
but, just as Descartes was occasionally charged of not having been able 
to refute the sceptical claims he himself evoked in the First Meditation, 
Grotius was later sometimes criticised for being a moral sceptic, 
rather than an opponent of scepticism.47 this criticism results, in fact, 
from the realization that Grotius tried to reduce morality to a sort of 
minimal content so as to provide a conceptual framework for political 
stability and peace in an age characterized by great political religious 
conflicts.48
46  GrOtIUs. CLPB, 33-34 (DJPC, 18): ‘For god created man aujtexouvsion, “free and sui 
iuris”, so that the actions of each individual and the use of his possessions were made 
subject not to one another’s will but to his own. Moreover, this view is sanctioned by the 
common consent of all nations. For what is the well-known concept, ‘natural liberty’, 
other than the power of the individual to act in accordance with his own will? And liberty 
in regard to actions is equivalent to ownership in regard to property. Hence the saying: 
every man is the governor and arbiter of affairs relative to his own property.’ the Latin 
text reads: ‘Fecit enim Deus hominem aujtexouvsion, liberum suique juris, ita ut actiones 
uniuscujusque et rerum suarum usus ipsius, non alieno arbitrio subjacerent, idemque 
gentium omnium consensu approbatur. Quid enim est aliud naturalis illa libertas, quam 
id quod cuique libitum est faciendi facultas? Et quod Libertas in actionibus idem est 
Dominium in rebus.’ cf. tUcK, r. ‘Introduction’, in Grotius: The Rights of War and Peace, 
edited by r. tuck (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2005), vol. 1, xviii; tUcK, r. The Rights 
of War and Peace: Political Thought and Political Order from Grotius to Kant (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) 84; WEstErMAN, P . The Disintegration of Natural Law 
Theory: Aquinas to Finnis, (Leiden: brill, 1998) 135-137 and 168.
47  tUcK, r. The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and Political Order from Grotius 
to Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 102, where tuck argues that that ‘... it 
became to a degree a commonplace in late seventeenth-century Germany that Grotius 
had failed to refute Carneades because his own basic idea was the same, and that there 
was at bottom little to choose between Grotius and Hobbes.’ 
48  I am grateful to Peter Stemmer at the University of Konstanz for comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper, and to Humboldt Foundation and CNPq for the financial support for 
this research.M. Araujo – Hugo Grotius, moral scepticism, and the use of arguments ...
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